Malicious code planted in xz Utils has been circulating for more than a month.

The malicious changes were submitted by JiaT75, one of the two main xz Utils developers with years of contributions to the project.

“Given the activity over several weeks, the committer is either directly involved or there was some quite severe compromise of their system,” an official with distributor OpenWall wrote in an advisory. “Unfortunately the latter looks like the less likely explanation, given they communicated on various lists about the ‘fixes’” provided in recent updates. Those updates and fixes can be found here, here, here, and here.

On Thursday, someone using the developer’s name took to a developer site for Ubuntu to ask that the backdoored version 5.6.1 be incorporated into production versions because it fixed bugs that caused a tool known as Valgrind to malfunction.

“This could break build scripts and test pipelines that expect specific output from Valgrind in order to pass,” the person warned, from an account that was created the same day.

One of maintainers for Fedora said Friday that the same developer approached them in recent weeks to ask that Fedora 40, a beta release, incorporate one of the backdoored utility versions.

“We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added),” the Ubuntu maintainer said.

He has been part of the xz project for two years, adding all sorts of binary test files, and with this level of sophistication, we would be suspicious of even older versions of xz until proven otherwise.

  • FauxPseudo @lemmy.worldEnglish
    264·
    7 months ago

    Also they are counting the hits and ignoring the misses. They are forgetting that sneaking a backdoor into an open source project is extremely difficult because people are reviewing the code and such a thing will be recognized. So people don’t typically try to sneak back doors in. Also, backdoors have been discovered in an amazing amount of closed source projects where no one was even able to review the code.

    • Cosmic Cleric@lemmy.worldEnglish
      113·
      7 months ago

      They are forgetting that sneaking a backdoor into an open source project is extremely difficult because people are reviewing the code and such a thing will be recognized.

      Everyone assumes what you have stated, but how often does it actually happen?

      How many people, and how often, and how rigorous, are code reviews actually done? Especially with large volume projects?

      • SMillerNL@lemmy.worldEnglish
        13·
        7 months ago

        Depends on the project, but for a lot of projects code review is mandatory before merging. For XZ the sole maintainer can do whatever they want.

        • Cosmic Cleric@lemmy.worldEnglish
          122·
          7 months ago

          Depends on the project, but for a lot of projects code review is mandatory before merging. For XZ the sole maintainer can do whatever they want.

          I’ve done plenty of code reviews in my time, and I know one thing, the more busy you are, the faster you go through code reviews, and the more chance things can be missed.

          I would hope that for the real serious shit (like security) the code reviews are always thorough and complete, but I know my fellow coding brethren, and we all know that’s not always the case. Time is a precious resource, and managers don’t always give you the time you need to do the job right.

          Personally I use a distro backed indirectly by a corporation and hope that each release gets the thorough review that it needs, but human nature is always a factor in these things as well, and honestly, there are times when everyone thinks everyone else is doing a certain task, and the task falls between the cracks.

      • olympicyes@lemmy.worldEnglish
        11·
        7 months ago

        Reviewing the code was irrelevant in this case because the back door only existed in the binaries.